Team, Visitors, External Collaborators
Overall Objectives
Research Program
Application Domains
Highlights of the Year
New Software and Platforms
New Results
Bilateral Contracts and Grants with Industry
Partnerships and Cooperations
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Section: New Results

Security and Privacy

Participants : Mohammad-Mahdi Bazm, Fatima Zahra Boujdad, Wilmer Edicson Garzon Alfonso, Jean-Marc Menaud, Sirine Sayadi, Mario Südholt.

This year the team has provided two major contributions on security and privacy challenges in distributed systems. First, we have extended our model for secure and privacy-aware biomedical analyses, as well as started to explore the impact of the big-data analyses in this context. Second, we have contributed mitigation methods for Cloud-based side-channel attacks.

In [24], we have developed a methodology for the development of secure and privacy-aware biomedical analyses we motivate the need for real distributed biomedical analyses in the context of several ongoing projects, including the I-CAN project that involves 34 French hospitals and affiliated research groups. We present a set of distributed architectures for such analyses that we have derived from discussions with different medical research groups and a study of related work. These architectures allow for scalability, security/privacy and reproducibility properties to be taken into account. A predefined set of architectures allows medecins and biomedical engineers to define high-level distributed architectures for biomedical analyses that ensure strong security and constraints on private data. Architectures from this set can then be implemented with ease because of detailed, also predefined, detailed implementation templates. Finally, we illustrate how these architectures can serve as the basis of a development method for biomedical distributed analyses.

In [10] and [23], we presented a new taxonomy for container security with a particular focus on data transmitted through the virtualization boundary. Containerization is a lightweight virtualization technique reducing virtualization overhead and deployment latency compared to full VM; its popularity is quickly increasing. However, due to kernel sharing, containers provide less isolation than full VM. Thus, a compromised container may break out of its isolated context and gain root access to the host server. This is a huge concern, especially in multi-tenant cloud environments where we can find running on a single server containers serving very different purposes, such as banking microservices, compute nodes or honeypots. Thus, containers with specific security needs should be able to tune their own security level. Because OS-level defense approaches inherited from time-sharing OS generally requires administrator rights and aim to protect the entire system, they are not fully suitable to protect usermode containers. Research recently made several contributions to deliver enhanced security to containers from host OS level to (partially) solve these challenges. In this survey, we propose a new taxonomy on container defense at the infrastructure level with a particular focus on the virtualization boundary, where interactions between kernel and containers take place. We then classify the most promising defense frameworks into these categories.

Finally, we have leveraged an approach based on Moving Target Defense (MTD) theory to interrupt a cache-based side-channel attack between two Linux containers in the context of the Mohammad Mahdi's PhD thesis [1]. MTD allows us to make the configuration of system more dynamic and consequently more harder to attack by an adversary, by using shuffling at different level of system and cloud. Our approach does not need to carrying modification neither into the guest OS or the hypervisor. Experimental results show that our approach imposes very low performance overhead. We have also provided a survey on the isolation challenge and on the cache-based side-channel attacks in cloud computing infrastructures. We have developed different approaches to detect/mitigate cross-VM/cross-containers cache-based side-channel attacks. Regarding the detection of cache-based side-channel attacks, we have enabled their detection by leveraging Hardware performance Counters (HPCs) and Intel Cache Monitoring Technology (CMT) with anomaly detection approaches to identify a malicious virtual machine or a Linux container. Our experimental results show a high detection rate.