Team, Visitors, External Collaborators
Overall Objectives
Research Program
Application Domains
Highlights of the Year
New Software and Platforms
New Results
Bilateral Contracts and Grants with Industry
Partnerships and Cooperations
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Section: New Results


Participants : Nicolas Bellec, Damien Hardy, Kévin Le Bon, Isabelle Puaut, Erven Rohou.

Attack detection co-processor for real-time systems

Participants : Nicolas Bellec, Isabelle Puaut.

Real-time embedded systems (RTES) are required to interact more and more with their environment, thereby increasing their attack surface. Recent security breaches on car brakes and other critical components, have already proven the feasibility of attacks on RTES. Such attacks may change the control-flow of the programs, which may lead to violations of the timing constraints of the system. In this ongoing work, we design a technique to detect attacks in RTES based on timing information. Our technique is based on a monitor, implemented in hardware to preserve the predictability of instrumented programs. The monitor uses timing information (Worst-Case Execution Time – WCET – of code regions) to detect attacks. An algorithm for the region selection, optimal when the monitoring memory is not limited is presented and provides guarantees on attack detection latency. An implementation of the hardware monitor and its simulation demonstrates the practicality of our approach. An experimental study evaluates the maximum attack detection latency for different monitor memory budgets.

This work is done in collaboration with the CIDRE and CAIRN teams.

Multi-nop fault injection attack

Participants : Damien Hardy, Erven Rohou.

The CIDRE team has developed a platform named Traitor that allows to perform multiple fault injection attack by replacing instructions by nops during the execution of a program. In this context, we are defining a program model where each instruction can be replaced by a nop at runtime. On this model we plan to apply compilation techniques on the binary to automatically determine where nops have to be inserted at runtime to perform sophisticated attacks such as dump of memory, modification of the memory, memory protection deactivation, execution of code in RAM.

This work is done in collaboration with the CIDRE team.

Compiler-based automation of side-channel countermeasures

Participants : Damien Hardy, Erven Rohou.

Masking is a popular protection against side-channel analysis exploiting the power consumption or electromagnetic radiations. Besides the many schemes based on simple Boolean encoding, some alternative schemes such as Orthogonal Direct Sum Masking (ODSM) or Inner Product Masking (IP) aim to provide more security, reduce the entropy or combine masking with fault detection. The practical implementation of those schemes is done manually at assembly or source-code level, some of them even stay purely theoretical. We proposed a compiler extension to automatically apply different masking schemes for block cipher algorithms. We introduced a generic approach to describe the schemes and we inserted three of them at compile-time on an AES implementation. Currently, a practical side-channel analysis is performed in collaboration with TAMIS to assess the correctness and the performance of the code inserted.

This work is done in collaboration with the TAMIS team.

Platform for adaptive dynamic protection of programs

Participants : Kévin Le Bon, Erven Rohou.

Memory corruption attacks are a serious threat for system integrity. Many techniques have been developed in order to protect systems from these attacks. However, the deployment of heavy protections often degrades the performance of programs. We propose [36] a dynamic approach that adapts the protection level of the target process during its execution depending on the observed behavior.