Software Packages and Prototypes
The SECSI project started in 2002 with a relatively large software basis: tools to parse, translate, and verify cryptographic protocols which are part of the RNTL project EVA (including CPV , CPV2 , Securify ), a static analysis tool (CSur ), an intrusion detection tool (logWeaver ). These programs were started before SECSI was created.
The SPORE Web page was new in 2002. It is a public and open repository of cryptographic protocols. Its purpose is to collect information on cryptographic protocols, their design, proofs, attacks, at the international level.
2003 and 2004 brought new developments. In intrusion detection, a completely new project has started, which benefited from the lessons learned in the DICO project: faster, more versatile, the ORCHIDS intrusion detection system promises to become the most powerful intrusion detection system around.
In 2005, the development of ORCHIDS reached maturity. ORCHIDS works reliably in practice, and has been used so at the level of the local network of LSV, ENS Cachan. Several additional sensors have been added, including one based on comparing statistical entropy of network packets to detect corruption attacks on cryptographic protocols. A tool paper on ORCHIDS was presented at the CAV'2005 international conference, Edinburgh, Scotland  .
In 2006-07, a new prototype, NetQi, was initiated to test ideas on predicting network faults and attacks. This consists of two parts. One collects data from a network, and infers dependencies between services, between services and local files, and between local files, for example of the form “if A fails then B may fail”. This uses N -gram based statistical techniques. The other exploits the dependency graphs thus obtained to detect scenarios that would violate some properties in an expressive game logic involving temporal constraints  .
The CSur project consisted in developing a static analysis tool able to detect leakage of confidential data from programs written in C. Its design and development covered the period 2002-2004. The main challenge was to properly integrate Dolev-Yao style cryptographic protocol analysis with pointer alias analysis. Once development was over, a paper  was published, which explains the techniques used. (A journal version was submitted in June 2005. No news since then.)
The h1 tool suite was created in 2004 to support the discovery for security proofs, to output corresponding formal proofs in the Coq proof assistant, and also to provide a suite of tools allowing one to manipulate tree automata automatically  .
Finally the PROUVÉ parser library is the analoguous of the above mentionned tools of the RNTL project EVA for the PROUVÉ specification language.