Section: New Results
Verification of Security Protocols: Formal Model and Computational Model
Participants : Martín Abadi [ Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley and University of California, Santa Cruz ] , Bruno Blanchet, Hubert Comon-Lundh [ INRIA, ENS Cachan, and RCIS, AIST ] .
In  , we discuss progress in the verification of security protocols. Focusing on a small, classic example, the Wide-Mouth Frog protocol, we stress the use of program-like representations of protocols, and their automatic analysis in symbolic and computational models. Specifically, we compare two analyses of this protocol. The first one relies on ProVerif for verifying the protocol in the symbolic model and uses a recent computational soundness theorem in order to infer security in the computational model. The second one uses CryptoVerif to obtain a direct proof in the computational model.