Team Abstraction

Overall Objectives
Scientific Foundations
Application Domains
New Results
Contracts and Grants with Industry
Other Grants and Activities

Section: Software


Participants : Bruno Blanchet [ correspondent ] , Xavier Allamigeon [ April–July 2004 ] , Ben Smyth [ Sept. 2009–Feb. 2010 ] .

ProVerif ( ) is an automatic security protocol verifier, in the formal model (so called Dolev–Yao model). In this model, cryptographic primitives are considered as black boxes. This protocol verifier is based on an abstract representation of the protocol by Horn clauses. Its main features are:

The ProVerif verifier can prove the following properties:

ProVerif has been used by researchers for studying various kinds of protocols, including electronic voting protocols, certified email protocols, and zero-knowledge protocols. It has been used as a back-end for the tool TulaFale implemented at Microsoft Research Cambridge, which verifies web services protocols. It has also been used as a back-end for verifying implementations of protocols in F# (a dialect of ML included in .NET), by Microsoft Research Cambridge and the joint INRIA-Microsoft research center.

ProVerif is freely available on the web, at , under the GPL license.


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